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I. Introduction
On 26 November 2014, acting on a 2013 Commission
proposal and after more than a decade of debate and
negotiation, the European Parliament and the Council
of the European Union adopted under the ordinary pro-
cedure1 the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions
(thereafter the Directive).2 The Directive aims to har-
monise the existing national rules governing actions for
damages for infringements of the EU competition law
rules and insofar as applied in parallel with those rules,
infringements of the rules of national competition law.
The harmonisation is justified by the belief that ‘diver-
gent’ national rules could practically ‘jeopardise the
proper functioning of the internal market’.3 Consequently,
the alignment of procedures is required to ensure that
the victims of competition law infringements do not
need to shop around Europe for the forum that gives
them the best conditions, as all the Member States pro-
vide a level playing field in terms of enforcing EU
rights.
Private enforcement of competition law is currently
centred in the three most claimant-friendly jurisdic-
tions: the United Kingdom, Germany, and the
Netherlands. In other Member States private enforce-
ment of competition law, especially in the form of
damages actions, has been almost nonexistent.4
Given that the differences in the liability regimes
applicable in the Member States may negatively affect
both competition and the proper functioning of the
internal market, the Directive was issued on the dual
legal bases of Articles 103 and 114 TFEU. Specifically,
the Directive seeks to remove a number of obstacles to
damages actions brought before national courts by
victims of anticompetitive behaviour, by providing rules
on the parties’ access to evidence, limitation periods, the
passing-on defence and a rebuttable presumption that
cartels cause harm. The Directive was issued to ensure a
minimum standard of protection, as a ‘floor of rights’
which the Member States must not derogate from, but
upon which they may advance by setting superior stan-
dards.5 The Member States were given two years to
implement the Directive. Yet, it seems that the imple-
mentation of the Directive has been no less intricate
for most Member States, than the production of the
Directive by the EU. Even though the deadline to trans-
pose the Directive was on 27 December 2016, the
majority of the Member States failed to meet this dead-
line.6 Only 10 Member States (Denmark, Finland,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the
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1 Article 294 TFEU.
2 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the
Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance OJ L
349, 5.12.2014, p. 1–19.
3 Recital 6, Directive 2014/104/EU.
4 Ashurst Report, 2004. Also see B. Rodger, Competition Law:
Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress across the EU,
Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer law international, 2014, 302p.
5 Deakin and Wilkinson, 1994, ‘Rights versus efficiency? The economic
case for transnational labour standards’, ILJ, 23, 289–310.
6 On 24 January 2017 the letters of Formal Notice were sent to 21 Member
States which failed to communicate full transposition by 18 January 2017.
Key Points
• The selected EU Member States (i.e. Belgium,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg) have faced
technical and linguistic intricacies in their attempts
to align the Antitrust Damages Directive’s provi-
sions with national rules.
• It seems that the copying/literal method combined
with the minimalistic approach dominated in this
transposition process, especially in newer small
Member States.
• In the context of the elaboration and gold-plating
methods, the paper also discovered some deviations
or uncertainties which require to be settled in the
future.
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Netherlands, Slovakia, and Sweden) notified the
Commission by 20 February 2017 of their full transpos-
ition of the Directive. After further encouragement, in
July 2017, the Commission sent reasoned opinions to
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia,
Malta, and Portugal for failing to notify the Commission
of their national transposition measures.7 Bulgaria and
Greece implemented the Directive in early 2018; and
finally Portugal was the last Member State to adopt mea-
sures transposing the Directive.8
While there are lessons to be learnt from the imple-
mentation experience of each Member State, the paper
focuses on four small Member States in Eastern and
Western European region. They are Belgium, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Luxembourg. Specifically, the paper will
investigate the approaches to the transposition of the vari-
ous provisions of the Directive undertaken in the selected
countries and the challenges faced in their attempt to
align the Directive’s provisions with their national legal
systems. It will also note the extent to which new changes
can better facilitate antitrust damages claims in practice.
After this introduction (Section I) followed by the
underpinning theoretical foundation and methodology
employed (Section II), the paper is structured as follows.
Section III outlines the consultation and implementa-
tion process of the Directive in the chosen jurisdictions
followed by the Directive’s transposition scope and the
right to full compensation in Section IV. Sections V–XI
then deliberates in-depth analysis of the transposition of
the specific provisions of the Directive in Belgium,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg with the concluding
remarks being distilled in Section XII.
II. Theoretical foundation and
methodology
While there is extensive literature on scarce private
enforcement of competition law in the EU and the need
for the Antitrust Damages Directive,9 and the relation-
ship between private and public enforcement,10 there is
barely any literature on the transposition of the
Directive in various jurisdictions, especially in smaller
less ‘visible’ jurisdictions. Indeed, currently the literature
focuses on large Member states, such as the UK and
Germany with already litigation-friendly jurisdictions.11
Given that the Directive aims to level the playing field
for antitrust damages across Member States, the experi-
ences of the transposition of the Directive in other juris-
dictions with little private enforcement is utmost
essential. Therefore, closing the gap in the literature and
to raise the visibility of smaller Member States in the EU,
this article focuses on four countries in Eastern and
Western Europe, such as Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Luxembourg. By no means, this paper suggests that these
four countries are representatives of this region. Yet, com-
paratists predominantly argue that fewer jurisdictions
should be compared for proper representation of their
systems, especially taking into account linguistic barriers.
In this case four EU official languages were used such as
Dutch, French, Latvian, and Lithuanian. As a result, some
preferences had to be made. Equally, in order to depict a
broader understanding of whether all small Member States
face similar challenges, two newer small Member States
(i.e. Latvia and Lithuania) and two ‘old’ Member States (i.e.
Belgium and Luxembourg) were chosen. Latvia and
Lithuania and then Belgium and Luxembourg have a close
geographical proximity to each other, which works in
favour of the comparative method.
As far as the methodology is concerned, apart from
the comparative method, empirical research has been
undertaken with materials being obtained predomin-
antly from the primary sources, in some instances inter-
viewing members of working groups for further
clarification. Furthermore, comparative research gives
more weight to legal research, as it is not only limited to
comparing the specific provisions of several jurisdic-
tions, but it also acknowledges the background by which
these are sustained, for instance, insightful debates of
the working groups involved in designing the transpos-
ition proposals. Yet, this study refrained from large scale
comparison of these jurisdictions, such as the spirit and
style as well as the method of thought and procedures
of these systems were depicted solely to the extent
essential to better exhibit the transposition of the
Directive.
The paper also builds on the analysis of the imple-
mentation modalities in the selected jurisdictions.
Pursuant to Article 288(3) TFEU the Member States
7 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17–1935_en.htm.
8 Law No. 23/2018 of 5 June.
9 A. Komninos, ‘New Prospects for private enforcement of EC competition
law: Courage v Crehan and the Community right to damages’ [2002] 39
CMLRev 447; Dunne, N, The Role of Private Enforcement within EU
Competition Law [2014]16 CYELS 143–187; R. Van den Bergh, Private
Enforcement of European Competition Law and the Persisting Collective
Action Problem, MJECL, 20(1), (2013): 12–34.
10 Wouter P.J. W, ‘The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement
and Private Actions for Damages’ (2009) 32 WComp, Issue 1, pp. 3–26;
Hüschelrat, K and Peyer, S. Public and Private Enforcement of
Competition Law A Differentiated Approach, CCP Working Paper 13-5,
2011.
11 Rodger, B J (2017) Implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive in
the UK: limited reform of the limitation rules. ECLR, 38 (5). pp. 219–227
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have choice of form and methods of achieving the
binding result prescribed by a directive. They do not
have an obligation to transpose Directive’s provisions
provided provisions in conformity with that directive
already exist within the legal system of the Member
State in question. Yet, if this is not the case, the
Member States generally face two interconnected yet
distinct principal choices regarding methods of trans-
position. First, there is a choice between the copying
method of transposition (also known as literal trans-
position) and the elaboration method of transpos-
ition.12 Secondly, there is a choice between the minimalistic
and the non-minimalistic method of transposition, known
as gold-plating. While the copying method is self-
explanatory, when it comes to the elaboration method
of transposition, two variations of this method are usually
distinguishable, namely the elaboration-concretisation
method and the elaboration-reformulation method of
transposition. The former method of transposition refers
to a situation when relevant provisions of a directive are
concretised in the national transposition measure in
order to become fully and effectively justiciable.
Whereas the later (rewording) method of transposition
‘entails reformulation of the relevant parts or provisions
of a directive for the purpose of ensuring coherent,
smooth, effective and proper operation of the national
transposition measure within the surrounding national
legal landscape’.13 This method could be risky as the
Commission can initiate proceedings following the
Article 258 TFEU procedure for the incorrect imple-
mentation, especially if the Directive contains a clearly
precise requirement (i.e. a rebuttable presumption that
cartels cause damage as established by the Antitrust
Damages Directive).
With regard to the second facet is concerned, minima-
listic transposition does not exceed in any way the min-
imum requirements of a directive—it does not go beyond
the minimum aspects required by a directive. Gold-plating,
on the other hand, exceeds the minimum requirements of
a directive, i.e. goes over minimalistic transposition.
Therefore, these transposition modalities will be explored
in the context of the transposition of the specific provisions
of the Antitrust Damages Directive in Belgium, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Luxembourg.
III. The transposition of the Directive
Even though most Member States struggled to implement
the Directive by 27 December 2016, Luxembourg was one
of the few Member States to transpose the Directive before
the deadline. The transposition act in Luxembourg was
signed by the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Grand
Duc on 5 December 201614 and it entered into force on
11 December 2016, meaning that Luxembourg will be one
of the first countries to apply the Directive in practice.15
With a slight delay, Lithuania was next to implement the
Directive, where Seimas (the Lithuanian Parliament) adopted
the amended Law on Competition (prepared by the
Ministry of Economy (Ūkio Ministerija)) which transposed
the Directive as a matter of urgency. The Lithuanian presi-
dent approved the revised law,16 which was then signed on
18 January 2017 and came into force on 1 February 2017.
The Belgian transposition Act was adopted on 6 June 2017
and entered into force 10 days after its publication in the
Belgian Official Journal, i.e. on 22 June 2017.17 Even though
Latvia was one of the first Member States to partially adopt
the Directive, there has been a prolonged transposition pro-
cess.18 Finally, on 5 October 2017 the Saeima (the Latvian
Parliament) after the final reading adopted the amendments
to the Competition Law and the Code of Civil Procedure
implementing the Directive, which came into legal force on
1 November 2017 almost a year passed the deadline.19
Specifically, the legislative proposal to transpose the
Directive into Luxembourgish law20 took the form of a
12 Other synonymous designations of this method include one-to-one
transposition, verbatim transposition or copy-out: see Regulatory Impact
Unit, Transposition Guidance (2013), para.2.18. Kral, R, On the choice of
methods of transposition of EU Directives, ELRev, 2016.
13 Kral provided expanded discussion on the variations of transposition
processes. For further reading, see Kral, R, On the choice of methods of
transposition of EU Directives, ELRev, 2016.
14 It was published on 7 December 2016 in the Luxembourgish Official
Journal - Mémorial A du 7 décembre 2016, n°245 (2016).
15 See Arrêté royal grand-ducal du 22 octobre 1842, N° 1943c/1297.
16 The President of Lithuania has the veto right. For instance, the
amendments to the Law on Competition (No XII-1027) dated 15/7/2014
to change Article 36 in order to set a maximum fine imposable by the
Competition Council was vetoed by the President.
17 Wet 6 juni 2017 Boek XVII van het Wetboek van economisch recht. The
several other provisions the title of the act refers to are part of Book IV
on the protection of competition and of Book XVII, Title 2 on collective
redress.
18 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/directive_en.
html. This also notes that Latvia has implemented Article 17(2) of the
Directive.
19 The Competition Council of the Republic of Latvia, Injured parties finally
have a facilitated possibility to claim for compensation for damages, Press
Release 11.10.2017.
20 Projet de loi relatif à certaines règles régissant les actions en dommages et
intérêts pour les violations du droit de la concurrence et modifiant la loi
modifiée du 23 octobre 2011 relative à la concurrence, Exposé des motifs,
http://www.cc.lu/uploads/tx_userccavis/4609_Violations_du_droit_de_la_
concurrence_actions_dommages_et_interets_PL_4609SMI.pdf, p. 7
(accessed on 15 March 2018).
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proposal for a special act21 by amending some provi-
sions of the Luxembourgish Competition Act of 2011.22
There is a general practice in Luxembourg not to
include rules with a limited scope of application in
codes with a general scope, such as the Nouveau Code
de Procédure Civile or the Code Civil.23 The provisions
of the special act apply in addition to the general rules
of tort law relating to damages. In case of a conflict
between the general rules and the rules of the special
act, the latter prevail.24
In Lithuania, there were two possible options considered
for the transposition of the Directive. The first option was
to amend both the lex generalis – the Civil Code and the
Code of Civil Procedure and a lex specialis – the Law on
Competition, whereas the second option was to transpose
the Directive solely in the Law on Competition. The first
route was quickly dismissed given the particularities
imposed by the Directive that do not sit neatly with the
Lithuanian standard provisions (i.e. the Directive’s imposed
rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm, different
limitation period etc.). Additionally, the procedure to
amend general laws, such as the Codes is more complex in
comparison to special laws. Similar to Luxembourg,
Lithuania opted for the second option and transposed
the Directive solely in the Law on Competition.
In Belgium, the Directive was transposed by inserting
a Title 3 ‘The action for damages for infringements of
competition law’ in Book XVII of the Code of Economic
Law, and by modifying several provisions of this Code.25
In contrast to all countries discussed above, Latvia
opted to transpose the Directive in both the lex generalis
and a lex specialis, more specifically in the Code of Civil
Procedure26 and the Competition Law respectively with
the proposal being prepared by the Ministry of Economy
(Ekonomikas Ministrija)27 and discussed with 15 other
authorities, including the Competition Council of Latvia.
Even though in Latvia some provisions of the Directive
were embraced in the Code of Civil Procedure, this does
not mean these provisions will be applicable to different
areas of law, as a new Chapter 30 covering ‘Actions for
damages from an infringement of the competition law’
was formed in the Code of Civil Procedure.28
IV. The scope of the application of the
Directive and the right to full
compensation
A. The scope of the application of the Directive
In all analysed countries, save Luxembourg, it is appar-
ent that the new rules on competition law damages
actions are applicable irrespective of whether it is com-
petition law of a European (namely Articles 101 and
102 TFEU) or domestic nature (i.e. domestic equivalents –
Articles 5 and 7 of the Law on Competition in Lithuania,29
Article IV.1 and IV.2 of the Code of Economic Law in
Belgium,30 Sections 11 and 13 of the Competition Law in
Latvia).31 In Luxembourg, however, the scope of appli-
cation is rather confusing. From the wording of the
Explanatory Memorandum it seems that actions for
damages are possible not only for infringements of
Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU but also of purely
national competition rules defined in the Competition
Act. However, Article 1(10) of the Luxembourgish Act
is in line with Article 2(3) of the Directive and provides
that the Act covers only actions for damages caused by
infringements of both Union competition law and
national competition law where that is applied in paral-
lel with Union competition law.32
B. The Right to full compensation
The most important principle of the Directive is that
anyone who has suffered harm caused by an
21 Loi du 5 décembre 2016 relative à certaines règles régissant les actions en
dommages et intérêts pour les violations du droit de la concurrence et
modifiant la loi modifiée du 23 octobre 2011 relative à la concurrence,
Mémorial A du 7 décembre 2016, n°245.
22 Loi modifiée du 23 octobre 2011 relative à la concurrence.
23 Projet de loi, Exposé des motifs, p. 2.
24 Projet de loi, Exposé des motifs, p. 2.
25 Belgian Official Journal 12 June 2017. The several other provisions the
title of the act refers to are part of Book IV on the protection of
competition and of Book XVII, Title 2 on collective redress.
26 Adding a new Chapter covering ‘actions for damages from an
infringement of the competition law’, No. 90/TA-2542 (2016). In
addition, Latvia recommended some amendments to documents
associated to Competition law, such as Cabinet Regulation No. 179 of
29 March 2016, ‘The Procedures for the determining of Fines for
Violations Referred to in Section 11, Paragraph one and Section 13 of the
Competition Law and Section 5, 6 and 8 of the Unfair Retail trade
Practices Prohibition Law’.
27 The Competition Council of Latvia is subordinate of the Ministry of
Economy.
28 No 90/TA-2542 (2016).
29 The scope is defined in Article 43 of the Law on Competition in
Lithuania.
30 Documents Chambre of Representatives 54, 2413/001, p. 17. Art. 13 of
the Draft bill delineated the scope of application of the Code of
Economic law’s title on damages actions for infringements of competition
law by referring to ‘actions for damages under Belgian law’. The Council
of the State considered this unclear and advised to provide clarifications
in the Explanatory Memorandum (Documents Chambre of
Representatives 54, 2413/001, p. 85). A more solid solution was chosen
and the text of the Article itself was modified, deleting the words ‘in het
Belgische recht’ (under Belgian law).
31 The scope is defined in Section 21(1) of the Competition law and Article
25065 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
32 Preamble Directive 2014/104, para 9.
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infringement of competition law, has the right to full
compensation.33 Prior to the Directive, this principle
was unevenly enforced in different Member States lead-
ing to claimants ‘forum shopping’ for the most favour-
able jurisdiction. The Directive clearly elucidates that
full compensation embraces actual loss (damnum emer-
gens), loss of profit (lurcrum cessans), plus the payment
of interest.34 Recital 12 further elaborates that the pay-
ment of interest is an essential component of compensa-
tion by taking into account the effluxion of time and is
due from the time when the harm occurred until the
time when compensation is paid, without prejudice to
the qualification of such interest as compensatory or
default interest under national law.
Traditionally, in Lithuania damage is compensated
from the day when it was caused, or if the damage
appeared later, from the day of its appearance.35 Yet,
the Lithuanian civil procedure and case law allow only
compensatory interest.36 These are normally process
interest calculated from the lodge of proceedings in
courts; and interest is not always due from the moment
when the harm was sustained.37 Given that different cal-
culations may be applied by other specialised laws, the
amended Law on Competition literally followed the text
of the Directive by stating that full compensation
embraces actual loss, loss of profit and the payment
of interest, which are calculated from the time when
the harm occurred.38 Before the transposition of the
Directive, Latvia contained a general provision that a
person who has incurred losses due to a violation of the
Competition Law is entitled to seek compensation for
losses from the violator and interest due, set by law.39
Given that this provision did not meet the requirements
of the Directive, the principle of full compensation was
transposed almost by the letter in Section 21(1) of the
Competition Law in Latvia.
In contrast to Latvia and Lithuania and their limita-
tions of the right to full compensation, this right to full
compensation was not included in the implementation
act of Luxembourg because it already forms part of
Luxembourgish law.40 Even though the principle of gen-
eral law on damages existed in Belgium, it was, never-
theless, reassured in Article XVII.72 of the Code of
Economic law.
While the Directive does not specify which national
court should have jurisdiction for antitrust damages
claims, both Latvia and Lithuania employed the elem-
ent of elaboration-concretisation method and assigned
one national court. For instance, Section 20(1) of the
Latvian Competition Act provides that the claims for
compensation of damages, as well as infringements of
competition law, including infringements of a prohib-
ition of unfair competition, is adjudicated on the basis
of special jurisdiction to the Riga City District Court.41
Similarly, Vilnius County Court has exclusive compe-
tence to hear antitrust damages cases in Lithuania.42
Given that the complexity of competition cases
requires judges’ high expertise and experience, which is
especially lacking in newer Member States, it seems
logical for there to be a single specialised court. This
way it would be also easier to monitor damages claims
data and therefore, to prevent any potential
overcompensation.
V. Disclosure of evidence and its limits
A. Overview
Generally, it has been witnessed that in most Member
States the access to evidence was one of the main obsta-
cles to private enforcement.43 Due to so-called ‘informa-
tion asymmetries’ it was difficult for the victims to bring
forward the necessary evidence held exclusively by the
infringer or by third parties to prove their case.
Therefore, the Directive encompasses some provisions
to facilitate this access by introducing a more active role
of judges in ‘disclosure of evidence’.
Before, there were different practices in all ana-
lysed countries. For instance, in Luxembourg the
court could ex officio order all legally admissible
33 Article 3 of the Directive.
34 Article 3, Recital 12 of the Directive.
35 Article 6.288 of the Civil Code.
36 Article 6.261(1) of the Civil Code under contractual liability. There is also
the principle of general delict which contains the right of compensation
for damages. Yet, it does not specify what it actually entails. Article
6.263(2) of the Civil Code.
37 Explanatory Document of the Proposal to Amend the Law on
Competition No. VIII-1099 (in Lithuanian), 10 February 2016. Lietuvos
Respublikos Konkurencijos Istatymo Nr VIII-1099 Pakeitimo Projekto
Aiškinamasis raštas, 2016.02.10.
38 Article 44(2) of the Law on Competition. Also see Table 1.
39 Section 21 of the Competition Law.
40 Advice of the Association Luxembourgeoise pour l’étude du droit de la
concurrence, Document 6968/08, Chambre des députés 2015–2016, dd.
15.7.2016, p. 4.
41 This provision is also stated in Article 25065 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
42 Article 51(2) of the Lithuanian Law on Competition.
43 Commission staff working document, Impact Assessment Report,
Damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules, Accompanying the
proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States
and of the European Union, SWD(2013) 203 final, 11.6.2013. Available
at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/impact_
assessment_en.pdf (accessed on 20 April 2017).
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measures of instructions.44 If a party possesses evi-
dence, the judge could, at the request of the other party,
require him/her to produce it, if necessary under threat
of a penalty or of drawing unfavourable conclusions
from the failure to submit the document. The judge also
could, at the request of either party, request or order if
necessary under a penalty, the production of any docu-
ments held by third parties if there is no legitimate
impediment.45 Because these rules are more lenient than
those of the Directive, Luxembourg decided to maintain
its general rules also in antitrust damages cases.
In contrast to Luxembourg, neither Latvia nor
Lithuania had a particularly friendly mechanism of
access to evidence. Even though under Lithuanian civil
litigation a request to access to evidence could be
made,46 it was difficult to obtain any form of evidence
retained by the opposing party in practice. For instance,
the judge of the Supreme Court of Lithuania
Stripeikiene observed that ‘no requirement to disclose
information is established in Lithuanian Law’.47 This is
about to change in Latvia and Lithuania as pursuant to
the transposed provisions, even the defendant in posses-
sion of evidence needed to prove a potential damages
claim is obliged to disclose such evidence upon request
of the claimant.48 A failure to do so would result in the
fines being imposed.49 In addition, Lithuania provides
further provisions, which sparked some debates during
the transposition process. For instance, any access to
evidence in pre-trial situations is not possible. This was
expressly dismissed as the Directive imposes an obliga-
tion on access to evidence once a claim has been lodged
as interpreted by the Lithuanian working group.50
Furthermore, to avoid any fishing expeditions, the
access requesting party must reasonably specify such
evidence. An ‘alien’ element unknown to the Lithuanian
legal system is to order the disclosure of relevant cat-
egories of evidence. Therefore, the Law on Competition
indicates that these categories of evidence must be
clearly defined specifying their nature, format, subject
matter or content, and period when the requested docu-
ments were prepared.51 As a result of these detailed
instructions, it is most likely that specified items of evi-
dence instead of relevant categories of evidence will be
favoured (at least by courts).
Under the general rules of Belgian civil procedure,
the court may order any of the parties as well as any
third party to submit the evidence it possesses.52 The
conditions under which the court may exercise this
power are, however, stricter than those determined by
the Directive. Under the general rules of civil procedure,
the court may only order a party or third party to sub-
mit documents when the following conditions are all
satisfied: (i) the order needs to concern documents in a
wide sense, written documents, pictures, recordings,
digital data, passwords etc.; (ii) the document needs to
contain evidence of a relevant fact, i.e. a fact of which
evidence is useful; (iii) the document needs to be held
by a party or third party (evidence of this fact needs to
follow from serious, precise and concurring presump-
tions); (iv) the document needs to exist (not yet to be
created); and (v) the party requesting the court to order
submission of evidence needs to specify the evidence as
precisely and narrowly as possible. Given that the con-
cept of documents defined in Article 877 of the Code of
Civil Procedure is narrower than the concept of evi-
dence in the Directive as well as the impossibility to
request disclosure of relevant categories of evidence, the
Belgian legislator decided to transpose the content of
Article 5(1) and (2) of the Directive in a new Article
XVII.74. § 1 of the Code of Economic Law specifically
dealing with access to documents in cartel damages
cases and allowing the national court to order the claim-
ant, defendant or a third party to disclose specified
items of evidence or relevant categories of evidence
which lies in their control upon request of a claimant or
defendant who has presented a reasoned justification
44 Article 59 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
45 Article 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
46 For instance, Article 199 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables the
claimant to request the court to order the disclosure of evidence from the
defendant or third parties subject to the certain conditions (i.e. the
relevance of such information to the case in question and the fact that the
defendant or a third party actually possesses it).
47 J. Stripeikiene, ‘Klevo Lapas v. ORLEN Lietuva’ in G. Monti and
P.L. Parcu (eds.), European Networking and Training for National
Competition Enforcers (ENTRANCE 2012). Selected Case Notes, May
2014, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No.
RSCAS, 68, San Domenico di Fiesole 2014, at p 37. Available at: http://
cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31771/RSCAS_2014_68.pdf?
sequence=1 (accessed 25 April 2017).
48 Article 52(1) of the Law on Competition in Lithuania; Article 25065 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in Latvia provides that the disclosure of evidence
can be ordered upon a party’s request.
49 Article 52(9) of the Law on Competition in Lithuania refers that a fine on
individual not complying with the court’s order is up to EUR 10,000. On
the hand, Latvia introduced stricter rules where Article 25070 of the Code
of Civil Procedure refers that the court is entitled to impose a fine of up
to EUR 14,000 for natural persons and up to EUR 140,000 for legal
persons for failure or refusal to comply with the disclosure order or the
destruction of the relevant evidence.
50 The working group which prepared the transposition of the Directive in
Lithuania consisted of 10 main experts (in total) representing different
institutions, including the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Justice,
the Competition Council, and academics and practitioners with expertise
in competition law and civil law and civil procedure.
51 Article 52(2) of the Law on Competition.
52 Article 871 and 877 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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containing available facts and evidence sufficient to sup-
port the plausibility of its claim for damages and pro-
vided that those specified items of evidence or relevant
categories of evidence are circumscribed as precisely
and as narrowly as possible. Similar to Lithuania, there
were some concerns raised with regard to ‘categories of
evidence’, as potentially the entire categories of evidence
can be disclosed without individual judicial assessment
of whether all the concerned documents belong to that
category.53
It seems that while most analysed countries employed
the literal and minimalistic transposition approaches,
Luxembourg opted for its own national rules of tort law.
B. Limits to the disclosure of evidence
1. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality plays a key role in the
disclosure of evidence from the Directive’s perspective.
Given that the rules of Belgian civil procedure do not
provide a general requirement to limit access to docu-
ments to that which is proportionate as required by
Article 5(3) of the Directive, the Belgian legislator pro-
vided a specific provision, Article XVII.74. § 2 of the
Code of Economic Law, literally transposing this rule.
Similarly, in Luxembourg it has been chosen to intro-
duce a provision limiting the production of documents
to what is proportionate as well as the obligation of the
court to take into account the legitimate interests of the
parties and third parties and the Directive’s non-
limitative list of criteria that can be used to determine
what is proportionate. It is uncertain whether this will
in practice lead to a more restrictive disclosure than if
the rules of general civil procedure had applied.
In contrast to Belgium and Luxembourg, the prin-
ciple of proportionality is well established in the Latvian
and Lithuanian legal systems.54 Nevertheless, it was
transposed in Article 52 of the Lithuanian Law on
Competition which specifically notes that the request
for disclosure must be proportionate: the court will bal-
ance the legitimate interests of all parties involved in a
claim and other third parties concerned, including legit-
imate interests of confidentiality. Equally, the disclosure
of evidence in Latvia is also subject to the principle of
proportionality, as the court may refuse a request for
evidence if it considers that the amount of evidence
sought or the costs of obtaining evidence are not pro-
portionate to the amount of the claim.55
2. Confidentiality
Article 5(4) of the Directive requires the Member States
to guarantee that national courts have the power to
order the disclosure of evidence containing confidential
information where they consider it relevant to the
action for damages. When ordering the disclosure of
such information, national courts must have at their
disposal effective measures to protect such information.
The Directive in this context opens the door for the
elaboration method, as the Member States can deter-
mine the specific form these effective measures should
take. Yet, it has not been properly utilised. For instance,
Article 3(2) of the Luxembourgish Act mirrors recital 18
of the Preamble of the Directive and provides for con-
ducting hearings in camera, restricting the persons
allowed to see the evidence, and instructing experts to
produce summaries of the information in an aggregated
or otherwise non-confidential form. During the legisla-
tive process, the Association luxembourgeoise pour
l’étude du droit de la concurrence (the ALEDC)56
advised the legislator to include a list of cases in which
confidentiality can be refused in order to limit the
court’s wide (even discretionary) powers in this
regard.57 It further stressed the importance to specify
when ordering the production of documents that such
documents may not be used for other purposes than the
action for damages (a similar provision was included in
the Lithuanian Competition Law).58 This advice was,
however, not taken into account.
The Belgian Code of Civil Procedure does not contain
a general regime of confidentiality protection, but only
incidental applications thereof. Article 879 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides that the court, when order-
ing submission of a document determines the way and
the period of time in which this should take place. This
provision can be used to impose measures to protect
53 Advice of the Belgian Commission for Competition (hereinafter BCC).
Full-text available on http://www.ccecrb.fgov.be/txt/nl/doc16–1150.pdf,
p. 8. Note that the BCC is not the Belgian national competition authority,
but an advisory commission that is part of the Central Economic
Council, an institution at the service of the social dialogue. For further
information, see http://www.ccecrb.fgov.be/txt/en/2011182_1.pdf.
In Lithuania, see Lietuvos Respublikos Konkurencijos Istatymo Nr
VIII-1099 Pakeitimo Projekto Aiškinamasis raštas, 2016.02.10
(Explanatory Document of the Proposal to Amend the Law on
Competition No. VIII-1099, 10 February 2016).
54 Article 37(2) of the Code on Civil Procedure.
55 Article 25065 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
56 The Minister of Employment, Economic Affairs and Consumers asked
the BCC for its advice on the draft bill, see http://www.ccecrb.fgov.be/txt/
nl/doc16–1150.pdf.
57 For instance, it could have provided that information is no longer
protected when it becomes historical similar to the case law of the
European Courts which hold that information loses its confidential
character after 5 years.
58 Article 52(4) of the Law on Competition.
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confidentiality. Given the absence of more specific pro-
visions in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Belgian legis-
lator chose to transpose Article 5(4) of the Directive
almost literally in a new Article XVII.75 § 2 of the Code
of Economic Law. Similar to Luxembourg, the Belgian
Article, however, adds in a non-limitative way a number
of possible measures of protection, inspired by the pre-
amble of the Directive as well as the Belgian legislation
and case law, such as the possibility of redacting sensi-
tive passages in documents by requesting those holding
the documents to submit non-confidential versions,
instructing experts to produce summaries of the infor-
mation in an aggregated or otherwise non-confidential
form, conducting hearings in camera or limiting the
number of persons who can take note of the docu-
ments.59 The Explanatory Memorandum furthermore
refers to other protective measures applied in Belgian
case law, such as providing access to the documents at a
place where the requesting party can only inspect them,
but not make copies or take them along or allowing a
person subject to professional secrecy to distinguish
between confidential and non-confidential documents.60
The Belgian legislator did not consider it necessary to
transpose Article 5(6) of the Directive which provides
that the Member States shall ensure that national courts
give full effect to applicable legal professional privilege
under Union or national law when ordering the disclos-
ure of evidence. This applies even without specific
transposition.
Along similar lines, the Directive also inspired some
further changes to the Lithuanian Law on Competition
regarding confidential information.61 Article 52(5) of
the Lithuanian Competition law provides that the court
has the power to order disclosure of evidence containing
confidential information, if it is relevant to the civil
claim for damages. It also denotes several measures that
could be undertaken by the court to protect this infor-
mation: (i) by identifying the proceeding participants
responsible for the protection of the confidential infor-
mation; (ii) by prohibiting the confidential part of evi-
dence to be used for any other purpose than for the
claim in question; (iii) by instructing to prepare materi-
als without confidential parts in order for it to be
available to all the parties to proceedings; (iv) prohibit-
ing this information to be copied and/or disseminated;
or (v) by imposing other measures to secure the confi-
dential information.62 Similarly to Article 5(6) of the
Directive, it is provided that the information covered
under legal professional privilege as well as other infor-
mation inadmissible as evidence in civil proceedings is
not disclosable.63 Latvia, on the other hand, utterly
failed to exploit the elaboration method in this context
and solely provided that a person whose information is
given a status of restricted access information shall sub-
mit a corresponding derivative of the written evidence
without the confidential parts.64
C. Access to documents in the file of a
competition authority: a three-grade list
The Directive introduced a three-grade list to note the
extent to which documents and information in the file
of a national competition authority (thereafter the
NCA) must be disclosed upon request. First of all, it
introduced some blanket prohibitions on courts order-
ing disclosure (the so-called ‘black list’), such as leniency
statements65 and settlement submissions. Secondly, it
embraced that other documents in the NCA’s file either
prepared by a party or by the NCA during the proceed-
ings are open for disclosure only once those proceedings
have been finished (referred to as the ‘grey list’). Finally,
the rest of the documents are denoted to the white list
and are in principle disclosable.
It seems that all Member States discussed in this
paper share similar experiences with a limited access to
the documents of the NCA’s file. For instance, before
the transposition of the Directive, the power of courts to
order the submission of documents in the Belgian
Competition Authority’s file were limited by Article
IV.34 § 1 of the Code of Economic law, which imposes
the obligation of professional secrecy on all members of
the authority and on persons working for it and prohi-
bits to disclose confidential data and information
obtained in the exercise of their profession to any per-
son or authority, except when they are called to testify
in court.66 A similar provision was in place in the
59 See Documents Chambre of Representatives 54, nr. 2413/001, p. 24–27.
According to the BCC, the non-limitative enumeration of possible
measures of protection should only be mentioned in the Explanatory
Memorandum and not in the law itself (Advice BCC, p. 8). The legislator
did not take this advice into account.
60 Documents Chambre of Representatives 54, nr. 2413/001, p. 27.
61 Article 21 of the Law on Competition.
62 Article 52(5) of the Law on Competition.
63 Article 52(6) of the Law on Competition.
64 Article 25065 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
65 For instance, Latvia introduced the restricted access to the information in
the leniency application before fully transposing the Directive in May
2016. See Section 121(1) of the Competition law.
66 In addition, the previously applicable Article IV.45 § 2(2) of the Code of
Economic Law prohibited persons having filed a complaint and all other
natural or legal persons heard by the Competition college from having
access to the investigation file and procedural file, unless the president of
the college decides otherwise with regard to the procedural file. Following
the transposition of the Directive, it is added to Article IV.45 § 2(2) that
it applies without prejudice to the new Articles XVII.77 –XVII.79 of the
Code of Economic Law.
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Latvian Competition Law,67 the Lithuanian Law on
Competition68 and the Luxembourgish Competition
Act.69
Therefore, the transposition of Directive facilitated
access to documents in the file of NCA. For instance,
the Belgian transposition Act introduced an exception
to the above mentioned Article IV.34 § 1 of the Code of
Economic law ‘in order to produce evidence according
to the provisions of Book XVII, title 3, chapter 3’ which
contains an almost literal transposition of Chapter II of
the Directive (Disclosure of evidence). Along similar
lines, this chapter was literately transposed in Latvia,70
Lithuania,71 and Luxembourg.72
Yet, as required by the Directive, the Member States
must protect the information on the Directive’s grey
and black lists. Lithuania opted for the literal and min-
imalist approaches and strictly followed the Directive’s
narrow leniency definition applicable solely to a par-
ticipant of a secret cartel despite the fact that the
Lithuanian leniency policy incorporates wider rules on
immunity from fines and reduction of fines for the par-
ties to prohibited agreements regulated under either
Article 101 TFEU or Article 5 of Law on Competition.73
Given that the advantages of elaboration-reformation
elements were not explored, the transposition of the
Directive in Lithuania led to some confusion. The
Lithuanian Competition Law refrained from either
defining a ‘cartel’ (as provided in the Directive) or leni-
ency policy (or leniency statement). Instead, mirroring
the Directive for a presumption that cartel infringe-
ments cause harm Article 44(3) of the Law on
Competition refers to infringements of Article 101(1)
TFEU (and/or domestic equivalent Article 5(1) of the
Law on Competition) but only in the context of hori-
zontal agreements or concerted practices. Yet, Article
38(1)74 on exemption from fines has a different ambit,
as it is directed at an undertaking, which is a party to a
prohibited agreement between competitors or is a party
to a prohibited agreement between non-competitors for
the direct or indirect price setting (fixing) as specified in
Article 5(1)(1) of the Law on Competition75 and given
that it meets the specified conditions (which are
modelled on the EU leniency policy), it is exempted
from the fines provided for this violation. Therefore,
this perplexity will have to be clarified in future cases.
By contrast, Belgium employed the gold-plating
approach going beyond the level of protection required
by the Directive. Article IV.46 § 3 of the Code of
Economic Law provides an absolute access prohibition
with regard to all documents and information submitted
by a leniency applicant, rather than just leniency state-
ments, as denoted by the Directive.76 Equally, the notion
of cartel that is used in the Belgian leniency programme
is wider than that used in the Directive.77
VI. Effect of national decisions
While the Directive provides that an infringement of
the competition law provisions established either by the
NCA or the review court constitutes an irrefutable fact
in the same Member State for a claim of damages, it is
at least prima facie evidence of the fact that an infringe-
ment of competition law has occurred if this decision
was concluded either by the NCA or review court of
another Member State.78 These provisions were duly
transposed using the literal and minimalistic methods in
Belgium, in Article XVII.82 of the Code of Economic
Law, § 1 and § 2, in Article 51(3) and 51(4) of the Law
on Competition in Lithuania, Article 25069(1) and (2) of
the Code of Civil Procedure in Latvia, and in Article 6(2)
of the Luxembourgish Act respectively.
Interestingly, only the Lithuanian legislator used the
words ‘prima facie’ evidence. In Belgium the expression
prima facie is replaced with the provision that the evi-
dence is at least accepted as ‘un début de prevue’, ‘een
begin van bewijs’ (beginning of evidence).79 This does
not, however, change the meaning of the provision since
the Explanatory Memorandum uses the concept prima
facie evidence to explain the meaning of the concerned
provision. Similarly, in Latvia the Latin term of prima
facie is also circumvented. Instead, Article 25069 of the
Code of Civil Procedure refers that an infringement of
competition law established by a decision of the NCA of
67 Section 10 of the Competition Law in Latvia.
68 Article 21 of the Law on Competition.
69 According to Article 27(3) of the Luxembourgish Competition Act 2011,
the use of documents obtained as a result of a public enforcement
procedure could not be used for any other purpose.
70 Article 25067 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Article 21(5) of the
Competition Law.
71 Articles 52 and 53 of the Law on Competition
72 Article 33 of the Luxembourgish Competition Act.
73 Article 101 TFEU (and Article 5 of the Law on Competition)
infringements are not all of this nature. Rules on Immunity from fines
and reduction of fines for the parties to prohibited agreements,
Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania Resolution No. 1S-27,
28 February 2008, Vilnius.
74 Law on Competition.
75 Article 5(1)(1) of the Law on Competition is equivalent of Article 101(1)
(a) TFEU.
76 The transposition Act modifies Article IV.46, § 3 of the Code of
Economic law by adding ‘and the Articles XV.77, XV.78 and XV. 79’ and
introduces the rules of the Directive on access to documents in the new
Articles XVII.77–79 of the Code of Economic Law.
77 See infra, para 9.1.
78 Article 9 of the Directive.
79 Article XVII.82 § 2 of the Code of Economic Law.
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another Member State is considered to be proven unless
refuted by the defendant.
In Luxembourg, final decisions of NCAs and review
courts of other Member States are accepted as proof that
an infringement of competition law has occurred and, as
appropriate, may be assessed along with any other evidence
adduced by the parties.80 The words ‘prima facie’ have sim-
ply been eradicated. The resulting provision appears some-
what contradictory: does a final decision finding an
infringement of competition law by a NCA of another
Member State form in itself proof of the infringement or is
it only an element to be assessed along with other evidence
of the (non-) existence of the infringement? The answer is
probably to be found in the interpretation of the word ‘pre-
uve’ in line with the English wording of the Directive: ‘evi-
dence’ and not ‘proof’. It is only a means of piece of
evidence and not a proof in itself.
On a more general level, it can be questioned whether
the different treatment of decisions of the own NCA
and those of other Member States is justified.81
Potentially, this can be solved through the preliminary
reference procedure in the future.
VII. Limitation periods
Pursuant to the Directive, the limitation period for
bringing actions for damages is 5 years, which begin to
run when the claimant has knowledge or should have
had knowledge of all the circumstances: (i) the identity
of the infringer; (ii) that the infringer violated either
Article 101 or 102 TFEU (or domestic equivalents, if
applicable); and (iii) that the claimant sustained harm
as a result of that infringement.82
Before the transposition of the Directive the least liti-
gation ‘friendly’ jurisdiction was Lithuania, as the gen-
eral limitation period for bringing civil damages claims
in Lithuania is three years.83 Therefore, Lithuania fol-
lowed the Directive and transposed the 5-year rule spe-
cifically for the competition law infringements.
Additionally, while using the gold-plating approach, the
Lithuanian Law on Competition added further clarifica-
tion on when the limitation period could be expanded.
For instance, provided that other individuals (save dir-
ect or indirect purchasers) who have suffered harm
caused by other infringers (not by a SME, or an immun-
ity recipient) have initially tried to get redress from
other infringers but it was deemed to be impossible; in
this case, they are allowed to claim damages from the
SME or immunity recipient even if the 5 year limitation
period has expired.84 The Lithuanian working group
decided to incorporate this additional provision in order
to prevent any possible circumstances where the exer-
cise of the right to full compensation is rendered to be
practically impossible or excessively difficult.85
In contrast to Lithuania, the limitation period for liabil-
ity claims is in Luxembourg normally 30 years,86 but is lim-
ited to 10 years when it relates to business transactions
between traders or between traders and non-traders.87
There is, however, some uncertainty as to whether the lat-
ter rule will apply to damages actions for infringements of
the competition rules. Since the general rules of
Luxembourgish law on limitation periods provide for a
duration of the limitation period that exceeds the min-
imum duration of 5 years provided by Article 10(3) of the
Directive, there was no need to implement this provision.88
In Belgium, all personal claims are in principle time
barred after 10 years. Yet, non-contractual liability claims
are subject to a specific two-tier limitation period: 5 years
following the day on which the victim obtained knowl-
edge of the damage (or its increase) and the identity of
the liable person, combined with an absolute time limit of
20 years following the day on which the event causing the
damage occurred.89 From the Explanatory Memorandum
it seems to follow that depending on the contractual or
non-contractual nature of the damages claim, the general
limitation period for personal claims or the special rules
for non-contractual claims are to be used.90
In Latvia, the general prescription term for bringing
civil damages claims is 10 years, which is longer than
required by the Directive.91 Thus, this limitation period
was reinstated in the revised Competition law together
with the set of conditions defined by the Directive on
when this period begins to run.92
80 Article 6(2) of the Luxembourgish Act: ‘en tant que preuve du fait qu’une
violation du droit de la concurrence a été commise et, comme il convient,
peut être examinée avec les autres éléments de preuve apportés par les
parties’.
81 This was questioned by the BCC, see Advice of the BCC, at p. 10.
82 Article 10(2) and 10(3) of the Directive.
83 Article 1.125(8) of the Civil Code.
84 Note: in this case the limitation period begins to run when all the
circumstances defined in Articles 45(2)(2) or 45(4)(3) of the Law on
Competition are discovered.
85 Article 4 of the Directive.
86 Article 2262 of the Civil Code.
87 Article 189 of the Commercial Code.
88 Note: instead, it transposed the Directive’s rules on the moment from
which the limitation period would run (Article 10(2) of the Directive was
implemented in Article 14(1) of the Act).
89 Article 2262bis § 1 of the Civil Code.
90 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 46.
91 Article 1895 of the Civil Code.
92 Section 214 of the Competition law.
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In addition, Article 10 (4) of the Directive leaves it up to
the Member States to determine whether a limitation peri-
od is either suspended or, interrupted, if a competition
authority takes action for the purpose of the investigation
or its proceedings in respect of an infringement of competi-
tion law to which the action for damages relates.93 It seems
that all analysed jurisdictions have preferred to suspend the
investigation. Reflecting the Directive, in Latvia and
Lithuania, the limitation period is suspended if the NCA
opens the investigation with regard to an infringement of
competition law to which the action for damages relates. In
this case, the suspension ceases one year after the infringe-
ment decision has become final (no longer appealable) or
after the proceedings are otherwise terminated.94 In add-
ition, in Latvia and Lithuania the limitation period is also
suspended for the parties, which are trying to reach out of
court settlement for the duration of settlement negotia-
tions.95 The Luxembourgish legislator adopted a minimalis-
tic approach: the suspension ends one year after the
infringement decision has become final or after the pro-
ceedings are otherwise terminated.96 In Belgium, Article
10(4) of the Directive was transposed in Article XVII.90
§ 2 of the Code of Economic Law. The Dutch language
version of this provision mistakenly uses the term ‘gestuit’,
which means interrupted. However, from the French lan-
guage version, the Explanatory Memorandum97 and the
fact that the ‘interruption’ ends one day after the termin-
ation of the proceedings, it is clear that suspension (schor-
sing) is meant. In the case of interruption, there is no
period of interruption to end, the original limitation peri-
od starts to run again at the moment of the interruption.
VIII. Joint and several liability and its
exceptions
A. Joint and several liability
Article 11 (1) of the Directive requires the Member
States to ensure that undertakings which have infringed
competition law through joint behaviour are jointly and
severally liable for the harm caused by the infringement
of competition law; with the effect that each of those
undertakings is bound to compensate for the harm in
full, and the injured party has the right to require full
compensation from any of them until she/he has been
fully compensated.
The concept of joint and several liability is a well-
established principle in all discussed Member States.98
Nevertheless, this principle was literally transposed in
Latvia99 and Lithuania.100 On the contrary, Article 7 of the
Luxembourgish act did not transpose the main principle
but only the exceptions.101 The legislator probably
assumed that there was no need to specifically transpose
the principle of joint and several liability because it would
form part of the general law of obligations.102 This
approach was, however, criticised by the Chambre de
Commerce which pointed out that in general civil law,
joint and several liability (solidarité) between debtors is
not presumed and that it can only result from the law
itself or from a contractual provision.103 This is indeed
what is provided in Article 1202 of the Luxembourgish
Civil Code with regard to solidarité. However, the case law
has also created the doctrine of liability in solidum: when
several parties contributed to the creation of the same
damage, the entire damage can be claimed of either of
them (without the possibility for the victim to be compen-
sated more than once). The main effects of the liability in
solidum are thus the same as that of solidarité. However,
contrary to what applies in case of solidarité, a court deci-
sion given against one of the co-debtors does not bind the
others, an action against one of the co-debtors does not
interrupt prescription against the others and an appeal by
one of the co-debtors does not benefit the others.104
Belgian law uses a similar distinction between solidarité
or hoofdelijkheid and liability in solidum.105 However,
contrary to the Luxembourgish legislator, the Belgian
legislator chose to include in the transposition legislation
a specific legal basis for the responsabilité solidaire or the
hoofdelijkheid aansprakelijkheid of the parties that are
93 The suspension shall end at the earliest one year after the infringement
decision has become final or after the proceedings are otherwise
terminated.
94 Section 214 (2) of the Competition Law in Latvia, Article 49(3) of the
Law on Competition in Lithuania.
95 Article 49(3) of the Law on Competition in Lithuania and Section 213 (1)
of the Competition law. It only applies to the parties involved in the
settlement.
96 Article 14(2) of the Act.
97 Explanatory Memorandum p. 48.
98 For instance, Article 6.279 of the Civil Code in Lithuania.
99 Section 21 of the Latvian Competition Law.
100 Article 45 of the Law on Competition.
101 See also the Advice of the Conseil d’État, Document 6968/03, Chambre
des députés 2015–2016, dd. 24.5.2016, p. 4.
102 See also the Advice of the Conseil d’État, Document 6968/03, Chambre
des députés 2015–2016, dd. 24.5.2016, p. 4.
103 Advice of the Chambre de Commerce, Document 6968/02, Chambre des
députés 2015–2016, dd. 17.5.2016, p. 3. See also the Advice of the
Chambre des Métiers which finds this Article insufficiently clear
(Document 6968/05, Chambre des députés 2015–2016, dd. 7.6.2016, p. 2).
104 G. Ravarani, La responsabilité des personnes privées et publiques,
Luxembourg, Pasicrisie Luxembourgeoise, 2014, n° 1017–1018,
p. 1003–1006; O. Poelmans, Droit des obligations au Luxembourg,
Brussel, Larcier, 2013, 440.
105 Yet, when several persons by a common fault knowingly cause damage
the liability will be solidaire in Belgium even though this is not explicitly
provided by law, W. Van Gerven and A. Van Oevelen,
Verbintenissenrecht, Leuven, Acco, 2015, 557; Cass. 3 mei 1996, Arr. Cass.
1996, 388.
11 of 17ARTICLEJurgita Malinauskaite and Caroline Cauffman . Transposition of the Antitrust Damages Directive
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jeclap/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeclap/lpy048/5056945
by Brunel University London user
on 25 July 2018
liable for a competition law infringement.106 Although
most antitrust damages claim will be extra-contractual
claims, they will be subject to slightly different rules
(regarding the secondary consequences of the joint liabil-
ity) than the claims that are subject to the general tort law
regime, where liability in solidum is the norm.107 The
Directive uses the concept solidary liability, addressing the
rules with regard to the primary consequences of solidar-
ity (which are identical to those of liability in solidum in
the Belgian and Luxembourgish legal system). Given that
advantages of elaboration-reformation method have not
been explored here to clarify these uncertainties, prelimin-
ary questions could be referred to the Court of Justice to
explain the ‘secondary consequences’ of solidarity as
defined in Belgian and Luxembourgish laws and whether
the determination thereof is left to the national legislator
based on the principle of procedural autonomy.
B. Exceptions to the joint and several liability
The Directive provides for exceptions to the joint and
liability where the infringer is (i) a small or medium-
sized enterprise (SME)108, or (ii) an immunity recipient.
First of all, without prejudice to the right of full com-
pensation a SME should be liable only to its own direct
and indirect purchasers where: (a) its market share in
the relevant market was below 5 per cent at any time
during the infringement of competition law; and (b) the
application of the normal rules of joint and several
liability would irretrievably jeopardise its economic via-
bility and cause its assets to lose all their value. The
exception will, however, not apply where the SME has
led the infringement of competition law or has coerced
other undertakings to participate therein; or (b) the
SME has previously been found to have infringed com-
petition law.109
Secondly, an immunity recipient, on the other hand,
should only be jointly and severally liable (a) to its dir-
ect or indirect purchasers or providers; and (b) to other
injured parties only where full compensation cannot be
obtained from the other undertakings that were
involved in the same infringement of competition
law.110
While all analysed countries literally transposed the
exceptions to joint and several liability, the gold-plating
approach can be identified.111 The Lithuanian Law on
Competition deviated from the Directive by adding to
the conditions for the SME exemption a third criterion,
similar to that which the Directive provides for immun-
ity recipients, namely that the exemption only applies
where full compensation can be obtained from the other
undertakings that were involved in the same infringe-
ment of competition law. Therefore, an SME is still
liable towards other injured parties than its direct and
indirect purchasers or suppliers if the other injured par-
ties are not able to recover full compensation from the
other infringers. Interestingly, the Belgian legislator also
holds SMEs liable towards other injured parties where
full compensation cannot be obtained from the other
undertakings that were involved in the same infringe-
ment of competition law, similar to the rules of the
Directive concerning immunity recipients.112 In Latvia,
a similar provision for a SME was also incorporated
providing that ‘when the market participant113 shall be
liable for the losses it caused to its own direct or indirect
purchasers or suppliers, or also other persons, who can-
not obtain full compensation from other market partici-
pants, who participated in the infringement of
competition law.’114
The question arises whether this provision on the
extended liability of SMEs is permissible. The
Lithuanian legislator seemed to believe that this liability
of SMEs was necessary as most companies in Lithuania
fall under the SME category. Therefore, to ensure the
exercise of the right to full compensation and in accord-
ance with the principle of effectiveness enshrined in art-
icle 3 of the Directive, a fair balance should have been
reached.115 Equally, given that the Directive’s provision
on the SME exemption contains the words ‘without
prejudice to the right of full compensation’116 seems to
suggest that the Directive aims to limit the application
of the SME exemption to ensure that the victims (other
than the direct or indirect purchasers or suppliers of the
SME) are not prevented from obtaining full compensa-
tion. Therefore, the implementation legislation would
then be in line with the meaning of the Directive.
106 Article XVII.86 Code of Economic Law.
107 W. Van Gerven and A. Van Oevelen, Verbintenissenrecht, Leuven, Acco,
2015, 565–566. See also the Advice of the BCC, p. 12.
108 A SME is regarded an entity with no more than 50 million turnover and
fewer than 250 employees. As defined in Commission Recommendation
2003/361/EC.
109 Article 11(2) and (3) of the Directive.
110 Article 11(4) of the Directive.
111 Article 45(4) of the Law on Competition.
112 Chambre of Representatives 54, No. 2413/001, p. 41–42.
113 The notion of ‘market participant’ has an equivalent meaning of the EU
concept of an ‘undertaking’.
114 Section 21 of the Competition Law.
115 Article 4 of the Directive. The Lithuanian explanatory memorandum
prepared by the Ministry of Economy, 10/2/2016 (in Lithuanian).
Lietuvos Respublikos Konkurencijos Istatymo Nr. VIII-1099 Pakeitimo
Istatymo Projekto Aiškinamasis raštas.
116 Article 11(2) of the Directive.
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Whether this is indeed the case, will ultimately be up to
the Court of Justice to decide.
IX. Passing-on defence and indirect
purchasers
Following the principle recognised by the Court of
Justice that ‘any individual’ is to be able ‘to claim
damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by con-
duct liable to restrict or distort competition’117 the
Directive states that both direct and indirect purchasers
of the goods or services sold by an infringer are entitled
to claim compensation.118 In order to avoid overcom-
pensation, the Member States require to lay down pro-
cedural rules to ensure that compensation for actual loss
at any level of the supply chain does not exceed the
overcharge harm suffered at that level.119
While the Directive recognises the indirect purcha-
ser’s right to claim damages, it instructs the Member
States to provide that in such cases, the burden of prov-
ing the existence and scope of such a passing-on shall
rest with the claimant (indirect purchaser), who may
reasonably require disclosure from the defendant or
from third parties.120 This rule, that is an application of
the maxime Actor incumbit probatio, will generally be in
line with the existing rules of civil procedure of the
Member States. The innovation the Directive brings is
that it adds to this principle a rebuttable presumption
holding that the indirect purchaser shall be deemed to
have proven a passing-on where that indirect purchaser
has demonstrated that: (a) the defendant has committed
an infringement of competition law; (b) the infringe-
ment of competition law has resulted in an overcharge
for the direct purchaser of the defendant; and (c) the
indirect purchaser has purchased the goods or services
that were the object of the infringement of competition
law, or has purchased goods or services derived from or
containing them. The defendant (infringer of the com-
petition rules) is entitled to rebut the presumption by
demonstrating ‘credibly to the satisfaction of the court
that the overcharge was not, or was not entirely, passed
on to the indirect purchaser’.121
When a claim for damages is brought by a party who
is not at the end of the distribution chain, the defendant
should be entitled to invoke as a defence fact that the
claimant passed on the whole or part of the overcharge
resulting from the infringement of competition law. The
burden of proving that the overcharge was passed on is
to be on the defendant, who may reasonably require dis-
closure from the claimant or from third parties.122 The
rules of the Directive do not, however, prejudice to the
right of an injured party to claim and obtain compensa-
tion for loss of profits due to a full or partial passing-on
of the overcharge.123
In order to avoid that actions for damages by clai-
mants from different levels in the supply chain lead to a
multiple liability or even to an absence of liability of the
infringer, the Directive commands the Member States to
safeguard that national courts in assessing whether the
burden of proof is satisfied, can seize an action for
damages.124 The Directive finally provides that national
courts must have the power to estimate, in accordance
with national procedures, the share of any overcharge
that was passed on125 and that the Commission shall
issue guidelines for national courts on how to estimate
the share of the overcharge which was passed on to the
indirect purchaser.126
Before the implementation of the Directive neither
Lithuanian nor Latvian law specifically included indirect
purchasers in damages cases and therefore, they had dif-
ficulties in proving their standing to initiate such claims.
The revised Competition laws in both countries incor-
porated new notions of ‘direct purchaser’ (tiešais pircējs/
tiesioginis pirkėjas) and ‘indirect purchaser’ (netiešais
pircējs/netiesioginis pirkėjas)127 and their explicit right
to damages claims.128 The Lithuanian and Latvian legis-
lators literally transposed the Directive’s chapter on
passing-on of overcharges almost by the letter.129 Upon
the receipt of the damages action claim, Vilnius County
court will assess whether the share of any overcharge
was passed on. These assessments will be calculated
117 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v
Courage Ltd and Others ECLI:EU:C:2001:465.
118 Article 12(1) of the Directive.
119 Article 12(2) of the Directive.
120 Article 14(1) of the Directive.
121 Article 14(2) of the Directive.
122 Article 13 of the Directive.
123 Article 12(3) of the Directive.
124 And without prejudice to the rights and obligations of national courts
under Article 30 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (Art. 15(2) of the
Directive). Yet, due account should be taken of the following: (a) actions
for damages that are related to the same infringement of competition law,
but that are brought by claimants from other levels in the supply chain;
(b) judgments resulting from actions for damages as referred to in point
(a); (c) relevant information in the public domain resulting from the
public enforcement of competition law.
125 Article 12(5) of the Directive.
126 Article 16 of the Directive.
127 These were transposed in Section 1 (81) and (71) in of the Latvian
Competition Act and Article 3 (20) and (12) of the Law on Competition
in Lithuania respectively.
128 Article 47(2) the Law on Competition in Lithuania, Section 21 of the
Competition Law in Latvia.
129 Section 21 of the Competition Law in Latvia.
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pursuant to the European Commission guidance.130 In
contrast to Lithuania, the revised Belgian law did not
make any reference to the fact that the Commission
would issue guidelines for national courts on how to
estimate the share of the overcharge which was passed
on to the indirect purchaser.131 There is no reference to
any EU guidance in the Latvian Competition Law either,
where the court has the right to estimate any overcharge
passed on.132
The Belgian legislator also almost literally transposed
the rules relating to the passing-on of overcharges.133 The
right of an injured party to claim and obtain compensa-
tion for loss of profits due to a full or partial passing-on
of the overcharge was included in Article XVII.83 § 2 of
the Code of Economic Law. The specific transposition
of the other parts of Article 12 of the Directive concern-
ing the avoidance of overcompensation, the application
of the rules on overcharges to supplies to the infringer
and the power of the courts to estimate the share of the
overcharge that was passed on, was not considered neces-
sary since they are already part of Belgian law.
In Luxembourg, the rules of the Directive dealing with
the relationship between the right to full compensation and
the passing-on of overcharges,134 the principle that it is up
to the claimant to prove the existence and the amount of
the overcharge,135 and the reference to the Commission’s
guidance on passing-on in Article 16 of the Directive have
not been transposed specifically. The idea is that these rules
would not add anything to Luxembourgish law. The
remaining articles were duly implemented.136
It seems that whilst adopting the copying and mini-
malistic methods, the transposed provisions of the
Directive in all analysed countries reinvigorated the
indirect purchaser’s right to claim damages and estab-
lished the presumption of the passing-on defence.
X. Presumption of harm and
quantification of harm
A. Presumption of harm
Building on the previous studies that more than 90 per
cent of cartel agreements lead to harm, the Directive
created a rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm.
In line with Article 17(2) of the Directive, all the analysed
countries literally transposed this rebuttable presump-
tion.137 The Luxembourgish Explanatory Memorandum
stipulated that the presumption relates in particular to
effects on prices. Depending on the facts of the case,
cartels contain an increase in price or prevent a decrease
in prices that would have occurred but for the cartel.138
Yet, only Latvia employed the non-minimalistic method
via its amendment of Competition law in 2016 by
embracing a presumption that cartels cause damage and
that cartels affect the price by 10 per cent unless it is
proven otherwise.139 It also transposed the Directive’s
definition of ‘cartel’.140 It seems unfortunate that other
analysed Member States, especially Lithuania, did not
take this path, as so far there has not been a single
damages claim caused by a cartel in Lithuania. Equally,
it transposed a narrow definition of cartel as noted by
Article 2(14) of the Directive even though the
Lithuanian national guidelines embrace a wider notion
of cartel (i.e. including vertical agreements). By con-
trast, the Belgian definition employed the gold plating
approach by explicitly adding that in addition to agree-
ments or concerted practices between two or more
competing undertakings or associations of undertak-
ings cartels may include agreements and concerted
practices with one or more non-competing undertak-
ings or associations of undertakings.141 Therefore, this
definition of a cartel has widened the scope of the
application of the presumption that cartels cause dam-
age in Belgium.
Finally, it is to be noted that this presumption in all
selected Member States (except Latvia) only applies to
the fact that damage was caused and not to its actual
amount.
B. Quantification of harm
Article 17(1) of the Directive requires the Member
States to ensure that neither the burden nor the stand-
ard of proof necessary for the quantification of harm
renders the exercise of the right to damages practically
impossible or excessively difficult. In the absence of EU
130 Article 47(1) the Law on Competition.
131 Article 16 of the Directive.
132 Section 211 of the Competition Law with further details on overcharge
being provided in Section 212 of the Competition Law in Latvia.
133 Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Directive were transposed in Article
XVII.83–85 of the Code of Economic Law.
134 Article 12(1)(2)(3) and (5) of the Directive.
135 Article 14(1) of the Directive.
136 The Directive’s articles 13 and 15(1) were transposed in Article 8 of the
Act. Directive’s articles 14(2) and (4) were transposed in Article 9(1) and
(2) of the Act respectively.
137 For instance, Article XVII. 73 of the Code of Economic Law in Belgium;
Article 2 of the Luxembourgish Act; Article 44(3) of the Law on
Competition in Lithuania.
138 Projet de loi, Exposé des motifs, p. 5.
139 Section 21(3) of the Competition Act. Hungary was one of the first
countries to introduce this rule.
140 Section 21(2) of the Competition Law.
141 Article I.22(12) of the Code of Economic Law. This definition is inspired
by the definition of cartel in the leniency guidelines of the Belgian
Competition Authority and the ECN model leniency programme 2012.
Documents Chambre of Representatives 54, 2413/001, p. 10.
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rules on the matter, the national courts of the Member
States have to determine the amount of harm if it is
established that a claimant suffered harm but it is prac-
tically impossible or excessively difficult precisely to
quantify the harm suffered on the basis of the evidence
available. This quantification could be established by
taking into account the asymmetry of information
between the parties and by comparing the way in which
the concerned market would have evolved in the
absence of the infringement. Article 17(1) of the
Directive was not transposed specifically in Belgium, as
these requirements are satisfied by the general rules of
Belgian law that the court has to estimate the damage.
Instead, Belgium transposed the provision that a NCA
may, upon request of a national court, assist the court
with respect to the determination of the quantification
of damages where the NCA considers such assistance to
be appropriate.142 In addition, existing Belgian law
allows courts to order expertise measures in order to
evaluate the amount of damages.143 The Explanatory
Memorandum noted that it would be ‘opportune’ to
take the Commission’s Practical Guide on the quantifi-
cation of damages into account.144
The Luxembourgish Act does not contain rules on
the quantification of the harm. Instead, the Explanatory
Memorandum referred to the Commission’s communi-
cation on the quantification of the harm resulting from
infringements of the competition rules and the accom-
panying practical guidelines, which may help the claim-
ant to submit to the court the factual elements relating
to the quantity of damages requested and to help the
defendant to respond to these elements. Yet, the Conseil
de la Concurrence, considered this guidance, however,
difficult to apply making the quantification of the harm a
heavy task for civil judges.145 Interestingly, there is visibil-
ity of the elaboration-concretisation and gold-plating
methods in this context in Lithuania, as the Lithuanian
courts and experts will have an obligation to emulate the
European Commission’s Communication on quantifying
harm in antitrust damages actions and the Practical
Guide146 even though it is not requested by the
Directive.147 Given that the Guide provides different cal-
culation models, it remains to be seen which model will
be favoured in Lithuania and how effectively it will be
transposed in practice.
XI. Consensual dispute resolution
To reduce the burden of courts, the Directive allows
damages claims to be settled following out of the court
procedures. Article 18(1) of the Directive requires the
Member States to ensure that the limitation period for
the parties (involved or represented in consensual dis-
pute resolution) to bring an action for damages is sus-
pended for the duration of any consensual dispute
resolution process, but for up to a maximum of two
years.148 In addition, the NCAs may consider compen-
sation paid as a result of a consensual settlement and
prior to its decision imposing a fine to be a mitigating
factor.149 The Member States also should ensure that, fol-
lowing a consensual settlement, the claim of the settling
injured party is reduced by the settling co-infringer’s
share of the harm that the infringement of competition
law inflicted upon the injured party.150
Articles 18 and 19 of the Directive are transposed
almost word by word in Belgium, Latvia,151 Lithuania,152
and Luxembourg.153 Article 11(1) of the Luxembourgish
Act adds, however, that an appeal to arbitration suspends
the limitation period for bringing actions for damages for
infringements of the competition rules when the arbitra-
tion clause has been annulled. It is interesting to note
that Article 18(3) of the Directive has not been
142 Article 17(3) of the Directive was transposed into Article XVII.77 § 2 of
the Code of Economic Law.
143 Article 962 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A similar rule was proposed
in Luxembourg. Projet de loi, Exposé des motifs, p. 16.
144 P. 15.
145 Advice of the Conseil de la concurrence, Document 6968/04, Chambre des
députés 2015–2016, dd. 1.6.2016, p. 4.
146 Communication on quantifying harm in antitrust damages actions,
Commission Staff Working Document, Practical Guide, Quantifying
Harm in Actions for Damages based on Breaches Of Article 101 or 102
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Accompanying
the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in
actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union, C(2013) 3440.
147 Article 44(4) of the Law on Competition defines that when it is
practically impossible or excessively difficult precisely to quantify the
harm suffered on the basis of the evidence available, the court informs
the parties that an estimated amount of damages will be established. The
estimated amount of damages is determined after taking into
consideration the Commission’s recommendations on damages
quantification. Experts must always follow the Commission’s
recommendations in their damages calculations pursuant to Article 44(5)
of the Law on Competition.
148 Article 18(2) of the Directive.
149 Article 18(3) of the Directive.
150 Article 19(1) of the Directive. In principle, any remaining claim of the
settling injured party is to be exercised only against non-settling co-
infringers, who shall not be permitted to recover contribution for the
remaining claim from the settling co-infringer (Article 19(2)). However,
unless the terms of the contractual settlement provide otherwise, the
settling injured party may exercise the remaining claim against the
settling co-infringer if the non-settling co-infringers cannot pay the
damages that correspond to the remaining claim of the settling injured
party (Article 19(3)).
151 Section 213 of the Competition Law. Yet, a duration for up to a
maximum of two years was not transposed in the Latvian Competition
Law.
152 Articles 48 and 50 of the Law on Competition.
153 Articles 11 and 12 of the Luxembourgish transposition Act.
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implemented specifically in Luxembourg. Probably, the
legislator found that the wording of Article 20(2) of the
Luxembourgish Competition Act already leaves room to
take damages paid as a result of consensual settlements
into account when determining the amount of the
fine.154
These rules were also transposed almost word by
word in Belgium,155 except for an unfortunate change of
the order of words in the rule relating to the NCA’s
power to consider compensation paid as a result of a
consensual settlement and prior to a decision imposing
a fine to be a mitigating factor156 as well as the replace-
ment of the Dutch wording of the Directive ‘buitenger-
echtelijke geschillenbeslechting’ by ‘minnelijke oplossing
van geschillen’.157 Yet, neither of these divergences, has
legal consequences.
XII. Concluding remarks
A robust transposition mechanism took place in all
Member States analysed in this paper causing some sig-
nificant delays in some countries, such as Latvia. The
article revealed that all discussed countries had to face
some technical and linguistic intricacies in their journey
of the transposition of the Directive and encountered
some challenges in their attempt to align the Directive’s
provisions with their national rules.
Specifically, the paper has addressed the approaches
undertaken in the transposition process of the Directive in
Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg, as the extent
to which the transposition of various Directive’s provisions
took place especially in the context of two main modalities
(i.e. the copying v. elaboration methods and the minimalis-
tic v. non-minimalistic approaches). As anticipated ‘old’
small countries (especially Luxembourg and to a lesser
extent Belgium) had more confidence in their national legal
systems, namely in their general rules of tort law relating to
damages. For instance, Luxembourg was ‘selective’ in rela-
tion to which Directive’s provisions should be transposed.
Indeed, the rules concerning the power of the court to
order the disclosure of evidence circumscribed as precisely
and as narrowly as possible on the basis of available facts
in the reasoned justification have not been transposed since
the general rules of civil procedure in Luxembourg are
more lenient and therefore, the position of the claimant in
this respect would not be improved. Whereas the copying/
literal method combined with the minimalistic approach
dominated in newer Member States, especially Lithuania
where the provisions of the Directive were transposed
almost ‘by the letter’, despite the fact that some principles
such as proportionality are already well established in the
national legal system. The copying/literal approach pro-
vides some sort of ‘security’ against any future actions by
the European Commission under Article 258 TFEU. It also
presents more legal certainty to national courts.
Furthermore, the paper has also examined whether the
elaboration and gold-plating methods have been utilised. For
instance, Belgium went beyond the level of protection
required by the Directive vis-à-vis an absolute access prohib-
ition with regard to all documents and information submit-
ted by a leniency applicant, rather than just leniency
statements, as denoted by the Directive.158 Additionally, it
also expanded the definition of cartel embracing both hori-
zontal as well as vertical arrangements. Therefore, this defin-
ition of a cartel has widened the scope of the application of
the presumption that cartels cause damage in Belgium.
Along similar lines, Latvia exploited the gold plating
approach in stating that a rebuttable presumption that car-
tels affect the price by 10 per cent, therefore, facilitating the
claimant’s burden of proof, as quite often quantification of
damages is another hurdle for private enforcement.
Furthermore, both Latvia and Lithuania employed the elem-
ent of elaboration-concretisation method by assigning one
national court for antitrust damages claims. The elaboration-
concretisation and gold plating methods are also visible in
Lithuania in the context where the Lithuanian courts and
experts will have an obligation to follow the European
Commission’s Communication on quantifying harm in anti-
trust damages actions and the Practical Guide159 even
though it is not requested by the Directive.160
154 This provision states that fines for infringements of Article 101 and 102
and their national equivalents are proportionate to the seriousness and
the duration of the infringement, the situation of the undertaking or
group to which the undertaking belongs and the possible repeated
character of the infringements.
155 Articles IV.70 and XVII.88–89 of the Belgian Code of Economic Law.
156 Article IV.70 of the Code of Economic Law.
157 Article XVII.89 of the Code of Economic Law.
158 The implementation Act modifies Article IV.46, § 3 of the Code of
Economic law by adding ‘and the Articles XV.77, XV.78 and XV. 79’ and
introduces the rules of the Directive on access to documents in the new
Articles XVII.77–79 of the Code of Economic Law.
159 Communication on quantifying harm in antitrust damages actions,
Commission Staff Working Document, Practical Guide, Quantifying
Harm in Actions for Damages based on Breaches Of Article 101 or 102
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Accompanying
the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in
actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union, C(2013) 3440.
160 Article 44(4) of the Law on Competition defines that when it is
practically impossible or excessively difficult precisely to quantify the
harm suffered on the basis of the evidence available, the court informs
the parties that an estimated amount of damages will be established. The
estimated amount of damages is determined after taking into
consideration the Commission’s recommendations on damages
quantification. Experts must always follow the Commission’s
recommendations in their damages calculations pursuant to Article 44(5)
of the Law on Competition.
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Finally, the non-minimalistic method was exploited
in all analysed countries (save Luxembourg) in the con-
text of joint and several liability by subjecting the SME
exemption from joint and several liability to a condition
where the Directive only mentions explicitly with regard
to immunity recipients. This means that a SME is still
liable towards other injured parties than its direct and
indirect purchasers or suppliers if the other injured par-
ties are not able to recover full compensation from other
undertakings involved in the same infringement. It is
uncertain, however, whether this constitutes a deviation
from the intention of the EU legislator who may have
considered that this condition was implied in the phrase
that the SME exemption is ‘without prejudice to the
right of full compensation’. Future preliminary reference
can unravel this uncertainty. Such proceedings may also
solve other questions that were left open by the
Directive, such as the so-called secondary consequences
of the joint and several liability.
Lastly, after the deliberations provided in this paper,
the near future will confirm the extent to which the
transposed provisions of the Directive will facilitate pri-
vate enforcement of antitrust damages actions in these
Member States.
doi:10.1093/jeclap/lpy048
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